(Kauffeld, F. J. (2002). Pivotal issues and norms in rhetorical theories of argumentation. In F. H. v. Eemeren & P. Houtlosser (Eds.), Dialectic and rhetoric: The warp and woof of argumentation analysis (pp. 97-118). Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic Publishers.)

On the Genesis of Pivotal Issues in Rhetorical Argumentation

1.         Introduction.

Historically, traditions of rhetorical art and those of dialectic have been charted by scholars somewhat wary of the view each has of its acknowledged counterpart among the arts of discourse. Today, students of argumentation, contemporary heirs of these venerable traditions, have undertaken a congenial reconsideration of the relationships between their respective arts. Prompted in part by Twentieth Century advances in the philosophy of language which bridge their ancient domains, contemporary rhetoricians and dialecticians converse with a renewed understanding that major concerns of each cannot be resolved independent of matters traditionally treated by its counterpart

Reinvigorated interest in the relationship between rhetoric and dialectic has prompted students rooted in each of these traditions to take more seriously questions and problems posed by the other. For rhetoricians, the resulting exchange has raised the question of whether there are specifically rhetorical norms pertaining to the argumentative adequacy of persuasive discourse? That question arises from the ways in which contemporary students of dialectic have explicated the relationship between their art and the rhetorical. Both are said to be concerned with argumentation, but where dialectic is assigned study of how argument serves its proper end, rhetoric is relegated a narrow interest in the capacity of arguments to effectively persuade. Thus Ralph Johnson, an informal logician who holds that rational persuasion is the proper end of argument, has suggested, “Both logic and rhetoric are concerned with persuasion by means of argument. But rhetoric is pre-eminently concerned with argumentation as effective persuasion, whereas logic is concerned with rational persuasion” (1997 , 5).  In a roughly parallel fashion the pragma-dialecticians, Frans H. van Eemeren and Peter Houtlosser assign to dialectic responsibility for elucidating the norms instrumental to argumentatively resolving differences of opinion, including standards of reasonableness, and they look to rhetorical considerations to illuminate the strategic maneuvers arguers adopt in order to resolve the difference of opinion in their own favor (1997, 51-55; 1999, 164; 2000, 295-299).Here, too, rhetorical art is a matter of the persuasive effectiveness of argumentation; dialectic addresses its internal adequacy. These views confront contemporary students of rhetoric with the question, Are there no rhetorical norms pertaining to the argumentative adequacy of persuasive discourse? Is rhetorical art, as some of its critics have maintained and some of its teachers avowed, narrowly concerned only with the effectiveness of persuasive discourse, or can rhetorical art, as Michael Leff argues on historical and contemporary grounds, sustain norms intrinsic to persuasive argumentation (2000, 244-245).

The present essay focuses on topics traditionally treated by rhetoricians under the rubric of stasis—teachings regarding the critical or pivotal issues in persuasive argumentation. This should be a particularly fruitful area in which to look for specifically rhetorical norms of argumentation. There would, I think, be broad agreement that persuasive argumentation is properly subject to norms which enjoin arguers to address the areas in which disagreement arises between themselves and those to whom their arguments are directed. Ralph Johnson, for example, holds that the end of rational persuasion imposes on the arguer an obligation to answer all actual and potential objections arising from opposing points of view (1997, 4). According to pragma-dialectic’s rules for the conduct of critical discussions, parties to the discussion have an obligation to defend the standpoints they advance, when asked to do so (Eemeren & Grootendorst, 1992, 208-209). Classical doctrines of stasis similarly admonish advocates to address the key or critically important issues arising within controversies. So an interest in the normative potentials of rhetorical art naturally leads one to wonder what, if anything, does consideration of stasis show about the norms of persuasive argumentation?

Discussion of this question will start with classical doctrines of stasis and then proceed to sketch a contemporary counterpart. Classical accounts of stasis provide an essential backdrop for study of the key or critical issues in persuasive argumentation, but, as we will see, they do not provide a normatively interesting account of the topic. For the latter we will need look to current work on the macro-structure of argumentation.

2.         Classical Doctrines of Stasis.

The doctrine of stasis has important antecedents in Greek rhetorical arts of the fourth century BCE, but it seems to have first been clearly formulated during the Hellenistic period by Hermagoras of Temnos. Both Cicero and Quintilian regard the rhetor’s ability to identify and address the critical issues, i. e., the stasis, in a disagreement as crucial to the rhetor’s success (Conley, 1990; Dieter, 1950; Howell, 1940; Nadeau, 1964). Accordingly they elaborate and carry forward the theory of stasis inherited from Hellenistic rhetorics.

Stasis refers to the basic issue(s) in a dispute resulting from the positions taken by the adversaries. Stasis theory, Conley observes, “is designed to enable one both to locate the relevant points at issue in a dispute and to discover applicable arguments drawn from the appropriate places”(32). Classical theories of stasis are formulated primarily with respect to forensic cases, i. e., pleadings in judicial contexts. According to the theory, four potentially key issues inhere in any forensic case. Suppose a person is accused of murder, the first potential question would be the conjectural stasis; were this the critical issue one side would argue that the accused did, and the other that he did not, commit the alleged deed. Were it established or conceded that the accused did what he is alleged to have done, the second issue would be the definitional stasis, i.e., Does the accused’s action fit the statutory definition of murder? Should it be shown or admitted that the what the accused did is murder, the stasis of quality might arise: Are there mitigating circumstances such as might make the act just, expedient, excusable or, even, honorable. Finally, where the issues of conjecture, definition, and quality are decided or admitted against the accused, there remains the translative stasis, i.e., the question of whether this court or judge has jurisdiction over the case. According to classical theory, any given case will turn on one or more of these issues, depending upon objections and counter-arguments are raised by the defense. Other matters, such as the defendant’s character, particulars of the deed in question, the letter vs. the spirit of the law, bear on the proceedings as they relate to an appropriate stasis. A rhetor trained in stasis theory would rely on its hierarchy of key issues as a guide to her analysis what points may be critically relevant in particular disputes.

Classical theories of stasis contain a number of important insights into persuasive argumentation. Perhaps the most important of these is that in a great many cases of rhetorical argumentation it is possible to identify key issues on which the argumentation turns. Secondly, classical theories show that it is possible to identify in the abstract the potential points of stasis for forensic argumentation and, perhaps, for other genre as well. And finally, as questions of fact (conjecture) and definition arise in many kinds of argumentation, it is not surprising that the inherited theory of judicial stasis has been regarded as useful in teaching argumentation.

However, classical theories of stasis cast relatively little light on the norms, standards, duties, etc. proper to persuasive argumentation. Consider the following three limitations the accounts of stasis we inherit from classical traditions in rhetorical art.

First there seems to be no explicit normative dimension to classical doctrines of stasis. To be sure, important Hellenistic and Roman treatises would have the orator guided by an analysis of stasis as she engages in rhetorical controversies. But the directions given the orator in this connection seem to be thoroughly pragmatic. The orator is not instructed to address the key or critical issues in dispute because she is required to do so by an obligation or other normative mandate; rather she is instructed to address the issues which form the stasis of the case at hand because she must do so in order to succeed in persuading her audience. The author of Ad Herennium is blunt about the matter. His discussion of stasis is introduced as follows.

Now let me pass to Proof and Refutation. The entire hope of victory and the entire method of persuasion rest on proof and refutation, for when we have submitted our arguments and destroyed those of the opposition, we have, of course, completely fulfilled the speaker’s function (1954, I. x. 18).

Both Cicero and Quintilian regard training in the invention of arguments based on stasis theory as an essential component in the education of the successful orator (Cicero., 1942, I. xxxii. 147; Quintilian, 1920, III. vi. 1-90).Cicero considers the development and exercise of rhetorical art to be a critically important civilizing influence; accordingly, rhetorical art itself has broad normative value(Cicero, 1949, I.3). However, the account of stasis given by both Cicero and Quintilian rests on purely pragmatic considerations. As Antoine Braet argues, classical sources “stress the psychological, strategic aspects of status,” treating the matter entirely in terms of the effects the speaker intends to achieve and assigning no role to probative obligations incumbent on the speaker (1987, 84-87). So far I know, it is not until the nineteenth century, with Richard Whately’ discussion of presumption and burden of proof, that rhetorical theorists come to hold that advocates engaged in persuasive argumentation have an obligation to address specifiable issues (Whately, 1963, 114-132). And even after Whately, students of argumentation in rhetorical traditions have been inclined to equivocate on the sense of “burden” in their discussions of the burden of proof and to rely a sense of the term in which “burden” refers, not to a probative obligation, but to the pragmatic need to provide reason and evidence in order to persuade skeptical addressees (Kauffeld, 1997).

Second, classical doctrines of stasis ignore the distinctive argumentative requirements of several rhetorical genre. Classical stasis theorists follow Aristotle in recognizing three primary rhetorical genre: deliberative, forensic, and epideictic. Cicero and Quintilian claim that the same four stasis—conjecture, definition, quality, and jurisdiction—inhere in all three rhetorical genre. However, as Lee S. Hultzen shows, both Roman theorists elaborate their views of stasis in connection with forensic discourse, only glancing in the direction of such issues as might arise in deliberative and epideictic rhetoric (Hultzen, 1958, 97-123, 105-107; also see: Hohmann, 2001, 741-745 ). There is compelling reason, as Hultzen argues, to suppose that the critical issues in deliberate rhetoric, which concerns what policies and courses of action should be adopted in the particular circumstances at hand, differ strikingly from the stasis in forensic discourse, which deals with just determination of guilt or innocence. In stead of conjecture, definition, quality and jurisdiction, contemporary textbooks on argumentation and policy debates hold that the pivotal issues in deliberative argumentation concern: (i) the need for a change of policy, (ii) the feasibility of policy proposed, (iii) the capacity of the proposed policy to meet the need identified, and (iv) the dangers consequent to adopting the proposed policy (Freeley, 1966, 161-164). While there has been considerable discussion of variants on these so-called “stock issues,” still, it seems that the pivotal issues in deliberative argumentation do not reduce to the stasis of forensic discourse. If that is true for deliberative discourse, how likely is it that the pivotal issues in epideictic discourse, which seeks to recognize the merit of achievements, would yield to analysis in terms of classical forensic stasis?

Thirdly, it is doubtful whether classical conceptions of stasis can accommodate the complexity of pivotal issues in contemporary rhetorical argumentation. The traditional analysis of stasis supposes that in any given dispute, parties to the disagreement will agree as to the pivotal issue(s), the point(s) of stasis. This supposition is rooted in the way stasis is expected to occur in the particular forensic pleading. A charge is brought against the accused, and stasis occurs where the defense enters its primary denial, i. e., at the question of conjecture or definition or quality or jurisdiction (Cicero, 1949, I. vii. 9 and I. xiii. 17-18; Quintilian, 1920, III. vi. 4-11). The point on which the judges decision turns, Cicero maintains, arises from this first conflict of pleas (Cicero, 1949, I. xiii. 17-18). While Cicero recognizes that the possibility of complex cases in deliberation involving choice among alternative courses of action, he does not provide an analysis of how stasis might occur in cases where contending parties disagree as to where stasis for their dialogue ought occur.

In much modern and contemporary deliberative argumentation, contending advocates do disagree over just what are the critical issues on which their disagreement turns. This important possibility is instanced by the contest over ratification of the United States Constitution. Debates over ratification commenced with the proposal of new plan for national government by the Philadelphia Convention in September of 1787 and continued through ratification of the Constitution in Virginia on June 27, 1788, approval in New York on July 26 and North Carolina on August 4. These debates were conducted in the press, via pamphlets, at public meetings and at ratification conventions held in each of the States. At the outset of the ratification process, proponents of the new constitution, the Federalist Party, called for a quick and favorable decision based on the authority and reputation of the leaders who had framed the Constitution while meeting at Philadelphia (Hamilton, 1993, 9-11; "A Revolution Effected by Good Sense and Deliberation," 1993, 12-14). But Federalist demands for speedy adoption were quickly countered by angry objections raised by their Anti-Federalist opponents. While generally conceding the need for stronger national government, the Anti-Federalists maintained that the proposed Constitution was simply too dangerous to adopt. The proposed change, the Anti-Federalists warned, would create a national government with a structure and powers that pose the gravest threats to the liberty of ordinary citizens. They claimed national government would be too large in extent to survive as a republic in which the rights of men were respected. Its principles of representation would leave plain citizens with no real voice in the affairs of the nation, while it consolidated unlimited powers of purse and sword in the hands of national leadership. Its division of powers between the judicial, executive, and legislative branches would not conform to principles known to be essential to the preservation of liberty. And the proposed Constitution did not even contain a Bill of Rights to protect rights of citizens. The Anti-Federalists maintained these and other threats to liberty as paramount considerations each of which sufficed to warrant rejection of the Constitution or to necessitate its amendment prior to ratification. And they angrily condemned the whole proposal as an aristocratic plot to usurp power and destroy the liberties won by the Revolution (Kenyon, 1966, xxxix-lxxiv). In response to this onslaught, proponents initially granted that the Constitution contained some defects, but they maintained that strengthening the national government was critically important and that on the whole the merits of the constitution outweighed its defects (Wilson, 1993, 63-69). Thus the opponents and the proponents of the proposed Constitution respectively framed what each claims to be the critical issue differently: the one side held that the decision was to be based on overriding concerns any of which warranted rejection of the Constitution; the other side held that the decision was to be reached by weighing the merits of the Constitution against its defects. From the Anti-Federalist perspective, the Federalist position claimed to counterbalance the dangers inherent in the Constitution with considerations that could not conceivably outweigh those evils. Accordingly, the Anti-Federalist regarded the Federalists’ argumentation as irrelevant. These contending parties initially occupied positions that were incommensurable. Their debate started as between ships passing in the night.

Complexity of the kind exhibited by the disparate framing of issues early in the debates over ratification is a recurrent possibility in deliberative argumentation. Here is a pattern: one side believes that a balanced view of the situation, e. g., needs weighed against dangers, warrants adoption of plan x; skeptics believe that the dangers or the costs or the very low probability of a positive outcome constitute overriding reason to reject x. This pattern is susceptible to reversal: in other situations, proponents of a course of action made hold that the need for action is a matter of such urgency as to override all other considerations, while opponents hold out for a more balanced view. When the issues in deliberations conform to these, and perhaps other, patterns, the positions taken by the parties involved will, at least initially, be incommensurable.[1] The fact that classical doctrines of stasis do not readily accommodate such variegation would seem to be a serious limitation.

Summing things up, classical rhetorical doctrines of stasis contain important insights but suffer from serious limitations. First, they teach us something about the pragmatic value of stasis; they rightly maintain that an ability to recognize and address pertinent arguments to the issues on which doubt and disagreement pivot is crucial to an arguer’s persuasive success, but they not identify a normative basis for this pragmatic fact. Second, they establish an analytical possibility of considerable interest to argumentation theory; they show that it is possible to identify in abstract terms the stasis which inhere as potential pivots for disagreement in forensic argumentation, but classical theories seem unable to mount analyses of the critical issues inhering in other genres of argumentation. Third, they introduce the theoretically important notion of stasis itself, i.e., the idea of propositions on which doubt and disagreement turn or hinge, but their formulation of this conception does not accommodate the complex interplay of disparately framed issues.

We should also notice that these limitations of classical theories do not preclude the possibility that the pragmatic facts about stasis have a serious normative basis, which more adequate accounts might disclose. On the contrary, it is often the case that conforming one’s behavior to appropriate norms is a key to pragmatic success. Moreover, supposing that the pragmatic importance of stasis in persuasive argumentation has a normative foundation, then it would not be surprising that neglect of that foundation would produce an unduly narrow conception of pivotal issues in argumentation. The limitations of classical accounts of stasis, then, may well be the result of inadequate attention to the normative facets of the phenomena. We turn now to a contemporary approach to the study of stasis which bears out these possibilities.

3.         A Normative Basis for Stasis.

Studies of the philosophy of language have taught us that in trying to communicate with one another, speakers commonly incur sets of obligations related to what they say (Grice, 1969, 1975, 41-58; Kauffeld, 2001; Stampe, 1967; Strawson, 1964). These include the duties of speaking truthfully, saying things which are relevant, informative, concise, etc. To many students of argumentation, it seems likely that an arguer’s obligation to address the issues critical to a disagreement might well arise in connections with the duties speakers typically incur in the course of seriously saying and meaning something (Eemeren, Grootendorst, Jackson, & Jacobs, 1993, 197; Kauffeld, 1998; Kline, 1979). This intuition points to a line of inquiry which, I will argue, enables us to explore the normative basis of stasis for persuasive argumentation.

A practical, Gricean interpretation of illocutionary acts provides a platform investigating the genesis of probative burdens in persuasive argumentation. J. L. Austin, it will be recalled, identified a broad class of speech acts which he termed “illocutionary acts” (1962). The illocutionary act, in Austin’s initial formulation, is an essentially rule constituted act, similar to marrying or christening, which is performed by saying something in conformity with the appropriate conventions. Studies by Austin’s colleagues have challenged the idea that illocutionary acts on the order of promising, advising, proposing, accusing, etc. are fundamentally conventional (Stampe, 1967, 1975; Strawson, 1964; Warnock, 1973). Rather, according to this persuasive line of an analysis, an important array of illocutionary acts are constituted by practical calculations based on resources inherent in the primary communicative act of seriously saying something. H. P. Grice’s analysis of utterance-meaning has been instrumental to this move from a conventionalist to a practical design account of illocutionary acts (Grice, 1969). Grice’s analysis provides an outline of what a speaker needs to do in order to seriously say something, and it suggests an account of the basic efficacy of saying things. According to Grice, a speaker (S) manages to say something by producing an utterance, while deliberately and openly making known to her addressee (A) that she wants A to respond in a particular way, e. g., believe what S is saying. Her efforts are designed, and in favorable circumstances serve, to provide the A with reason to respond as S primarily intends. Rationale for the A’s response is generated roughly as follows. By openly manifesting her primary intention to secure a response from A, S manifestly takes responsibility for her primary communicative effort. She thereby generates a presumption of veracity, viz., a presumption that she is sincerely expressing beliefs the truth of which she has made a reasonable effort to ascertain. After all, A can reason, S would not make herself vulnerable to criticism for mendacity, if she were not making a responsible effort to speak truthfully (Kauffeld, 2001, 2001a ; Stampe, 1967). This pragmatic account of the locutionary act of meaningfully saying something supports, in turn, a general account of how illocutionary acts work (Kauffeld, 2001b). In making a promise, for example, S says that she will come home at seven, thereby generating a presumption that she is making a reasonable effort to speak the truth, but to further reassure A, the promisor strengthens that presumption by openly giving A to believe that she will make this prediction come true, if only because she knows A is counting her (Stampe, 1970; Warnock, 1971).

In connection with the performance of some kinds of illocutionary act, speakers manifestly take on probative responsibilities. As a matter of veracity, speakers typically incur responsibility for having made a responsible effort to ascertain the truth of what they say, but in many kinds of illocutionary act, S does not, at least not typically, engage a larger obligation to provide, on demand, reason and evidence vindicating the truth and adequacy of her primary utterance. For example, where S makes a suggestion and is confronted with objections demanding that she substantiate the view she has expressed, she can quite responsibly respond with a disclaimer along the following lines: ‘Look, this is just a suggestion; I think it’s a good idea; you can take it or leave it’. In many cases of advising, warning, commanding, reproaching, apologizing, etc., speakers can reject demands for proof by saying such things as ‘You have my advice; I did not come here to argue about this’ or ‘I said that what you did is wrong and you should realize that it is; so far as I am concerned that all there is to say about this matter’ or ‘I said I was sorry, what more could you want?’ It may be that in such cases S is not being as helpful as she might be, but she will not have failed to discharge any obligation incumbent upon her by reason of the primary communicative act she is trying to perform. But, other things being equal, where S makes a proposal or levels an accusation, she cannot responsibly dismiss an addressee’s demand for proof. Suppose that instead of putting forward her plan as a suggestion, S presents it as a proposal. Now, she cannot so easily dispel doubts and objections by describing her proposition as a ‘mere proposal’. If she is not prepared to answer questions and objections, she can be criticized for failing to respect her addressees’ time and attention. Similarly, the accuser cannot readily repel demands that she substantiate her allegations. Should she offer a disclaimer to the effect that she does not want to argue about the matter, she would be subject to the complaint that having injured the accused by impugning his conduct, she owes him a fair opportunity to respond to the grounds she has for her charges. Generally, where S seriously says that p, she incurs responsibility for having made a reasonable effort to ascertain the truth of that proposition; in proposing and accusing and some other illocutionary acts, S characteristically incurs the larger burden of providing reason and evidence in support of the proposition(s) she puts forward for her addressee’s consideration, belief, acceptance, etc.[2]

Elsewhere I have discussed in some detail the genesis of probative obligations in proposing and accusing (Kauffeld, 1998). Here I can only offer a brief sketch of these speech acts. In proposing a matter, S typically wants A (her addressee) to consider something that A is inclined to disregard because A both doubts that S’s proposition is in A’s interests and that S has adequately taken A’s interests into account in arriving at that proposition. A, in short, is initially inclined to regard S’s proposition as not worth serious consideration. In these circumstances, S hopes that by presenting her proposition as a proposal she can at least induce A to regard it as worth tentative consideration and, then, eventually to regard it as deserving careful consideration. To generate reason for A to tentatively consider her proposal, S says, e. g., that they should work for the political candidate, Goodfellow. S thereby engages a presumption that she believes this proposition and has made a reasonable effort to ascertain its truth, but understanding A’s, S also openly commits herself to answering any doubts and objections A might have about S’s primary proposition. She thereby openly risks criticism for wasting A’s time and attention should her answers not show that she has taken A’s interest into account; A may thereupon be expected to presume that S would not openly risk such criticism if she did not have something to say worth, at least, tentative consideration.

In making an accusation S also incurs a burden of proof, but the genesis of this obligation typically differs markedly from the inception of the proposer’s probative burden. Accusations are primarily addressed to the accused, i. e., to persons believed to have commit acts which, at least, appear to be in the nature of an offense; accusations addressed to third party judges are, in a sense, derivative in their design from the primary case, but work much the same. Typically in the primary case, S believes with some certainty that A has done something which, at least, appears to S to be an offense and which S is inclined to resent. However, before seeking restitution, revenge, or punishment, S wants to afford A an opportunity to explain, justify, excuse or, if A dare, to deny doing what S is believes he did. In these circumstances, A can be expected to want to avoid answering for his conduct and may even be willing to falsely deny doing what S is convinced he did. S’s accusation is designed to impose upon A an obligation to answer for his conduct and, moreover, to impose that obligation in ways which preclude effective denial on the part of the accused. To demand from A the answer she believes she is due her, the accuser says that A committed the offense, she purports to be upset by the belief that this action was wrongful, and openly demands such answer as A can provide to relieve her disturbing beliefs. This attempt to impose on A an obligation to answer S’s allegations both forcefully impugns A’s conduct and commits S to treating A fairly. A foreseeably can purport to be unable to defend himself until S adduces the reasons and evidence on which S’s beliefs about A’s conduct are based. Thus, in the case of accusations addressed to the accused, the accuser it is foreseeable that S incur a burden of proof as a consequence of what she does in making her accusation.  The same consequence inheres in accusations addressed to third parties.

Although the proposer’s and the accuser’s probative obligation differ in their genesis, the commitments which a speaker undertakes in each of these speech acts provide a normative basis for demands that she address the issues raised by her addressees. In the performance of both illocutionary acts, the speaker commits herself to providing reason and evidence in response to doubts, objections, challenges, etc. articulated by her addressees. She commits herself, that is, to addressing the issues those doubts, etc. raise. I have spoken of this commitment as an “obligation” undertaken by the speaker. In this connection I rely on a sense of ‘obligation’ identified by the philosopher, G. J. Warnock. Professor Warnock argues convincingly that obligations are incurred where: (i) it is foreseeable that others will suffer or will continue to suffer harm in the event the obligee does not act; (ii) others are counting on her acting in order to avert, prevent, ameliorate, or rectify that harm; and (iii) she must so act in order to avoid speaking or having spoken or even having acted falsely (1971, 108). In both proposing and accusing an addressee typically will suffer harm should the speaker fail to adduce reason and evidence supporting her primary utterance. In the one case, the addressee’s time and attention will have been wasted; in the other, the addressee’s conduct will have been unfairly impugned. In both the speaker will have provided the addressee with reason to expect that the speaker will avert that harm by discharging her burden of proof, and, indeed, the addressee’s participation in the communicative event initiated by the speaker is warranted in good part by that expectation. And, finally, since these expectations on the part of addressees are generated by commitments the speaker openly undertakes, the speaker will have spoken and acted falsely should she fail to respond appropriately to doubts and objections raised by her addressee. In the broad sense of ‘normative’ relevant to argument assessment, the proposer’s and the accuser’s self-imposed obligation to address issues raised by their addressees’ doubts and objections constitutes a norm governing the argumentation initiated by the speaker. While I have focused on the probative obligations undertaken by individual proposers and accusers, it is apparent that similar obligations can be established at the beginning of meeting, the outset of court proceedings, etc. by utterances which identify the obligations incumbent on speakers as a conditions warranting the participation of their addressees.

4.         Stasis in Complex Deliberative Argumentation.

Having located a normative basis for the classical injunction that speakers are to address the issues raised by the doubts and objections of the parties they seek to persuade, are we now in a position to identify the key or critical issues on which various kinds of persuasive argumentation turn? In the case of accusing, the answer is, I think, relatively straightforward. The nature of accusing commits the accuser to provide reason and evidence which shows that the accused did what the accuser alleges he did and to providing strong reason for supposing that conduct alleged is in the nature of an offense; owing to the obligation the accuser tries to impose, the accused has opportunity to defend his conduct as justifiable or excusable; and the accuser can only hope to impose the obligation to respond, if the accuser can maintain the presumption that she is treating the accused fairly. So, the classical stasis of conjecture, definition, quality and jurisdiction seem to inhere in the act of accusing. In the remarks which follow I want to focus on the more difficult case of deliberative argumentation involving complex issues which are disparately framed by contending parties.

A proposer, who puts forward some plan, policy, course of action, etc. for (tentative) consideration, has at her disposal two important resources for strategically managing issues—resources which have a potential to create stasis between otherwise disparate positions. First, by discharging her self-imposed probative burden, she can generate a corresponding obligation for her addressee to carefully consider and substantively respond to the proposer’s argumentation. Second, a resourceful proposer may be able to interpret the issues so as to align her argumentation with opposing doubts and objections, thereby rendering potentially disparate positions commensurable. Prudently deployed these resources can create a configuration of issues which parties to the deliberation are obliged to addressed and on which their respective probative obligations pivot.

This potential for creating stasis in complex deliberative argumentation can be illustrated by reference to the argumentation presented in the Federalist Papers and by tracing the role that argumentation came to play in the debates over the United States Constitution at the Virginia Ratification Convention. In extended serious of essays written under the pseudonym of Publius for publication in New York newspapers and widely circulated in other states, Alexander Hamilton, James Madison, and John Jay radically reconfigured the positions previously adopted by parties engaged in the ratification contest. As noted above, the positions initially taken by Anti-Federalistss and Federalist were disparate. The Anti-Federalists argued that the many dangers attending adoption of the proposed Constitution were so grave as to each constitute overriding reason to reject it, while the Federalists responded that the merits of the Constitution outweighed its defects. The Federalist Papers radically altered this configuration of the issues. They articulated a comprehensive principle for weighing the need for the proposed Constitution in relation to the dangers which might attend its adoption. And they established this principle as the pivot on which the probative responsibilities of the contending parties turned.

Hamilton introduced this famous series of essays by proposing the Constitution for consideration by his countrymen. Recognizing that angry objections raised by his Anti-Federalist opponents were creating a climate ill-suited to candid and judicious consideration of the Constitution, Hamilton openly undertook a proposer’s burden of proof in order to induce calm and careful consideration of the matter. The key passage reads as follows.

In the course of the preceding observations, I have had an eye, my fellow-citizens, to putting you upon your guard against all attempts, from whatever quarter, to influence your decision in a matter of utmost moment to your welfare by any impressions other than those which may result from the evidence of truth. . . . Yes, my countrymen, I own to you that after giving it an attentive consideration, I am clearly of opinion it is your interest to adopt it [the new Constitution]. I am convinced that this is the safest course for your liberty, your dignity, and your happiness. . . . I frankly acknowledge to you my convictions, and I will freely lay before you the reasons on which they are founded. . . My arguments will be open to all and may be judged of by all. They shall at least be offered in a spirit which will not disgrace the cause of truth. . . . .

In the progress of this discussion I shall endeavor to give a satisfactory answer to all the objections which shall have made their appearance that may seem to have any claim to your attention (1961, 35-38).

Hamilton would have it to be presumed that he has thought the matter through, candidly taking his addressees' real interests into account, and he manifestly expected his commitments to provide reason for his addressees to tentatively give calm and careful consideration to the arguments Publius was about to advance.

Responding to Anti-Federalist claims that the potential abuses of power proposed for the new government provided over-riding reason to reject the Constitution, Publius strategically altered the way in which the Federalists framed the issues. Where his colleagues’ answers left the two parties occupying disparate positions, Publius constructed his probative responsibilities in terms which rendered the Federalist and Anti-Federalist positions commensurable. He first maintained that a competent national government was in the interest of all, and he articulated a broad conception of its responsibilities (see summation at p.99). Then, given these suppositions, Publius responded to Anti-Federalist charges by arguing that when considering any of the powers granted the national government under the new Constitution, it is not enough to ask whether granting such a power is dangerous; rather it should first be asked whether this power is necessary and, then, whether adequate safeguards have been provided to protect against its abuse (256).This construction of the issues afforded Publius a platform from which to address Anti-Federalist claims about the dangers posed by a national government having the powers projected by the new Constitution. At the same time, it afforded Publius opportunity to argue that the powers granted by the Constitution were necessary to the generally agreed upon aim of establishing a satisfactory national government. Where a power was arguably necessary, Publius’ frame for the issues denied the status of over-riding concern to potential dangers arising from the exercise of that power. Rather the dangers which might arise from the exercise of any essential power were to be considered in terms of whether the Constitution provided adequate safeguards against abuse of that power. Publius’s position, in short, reconfigured the issues so as to encompass the Anti-Federalist objections within a framework which allowed him to minimize the risks inherent in adopting the Constitution and weigh those risks in relationship to the necessity for a competent national government.

The argumentation which Publius provided in defense of the Constitution had the power to make his configuration of the issues the crux upon which deliberation about the Constitution would turn. The vehicle for moving Publius’ construction of the issues to this central position was the burden of proof. Following his design for the issues, the Federalist Papers systematically examined the powers to be granted the proposed national government and conspicuously provided answers to the challenges raised by anti-Federalists. At the conclusion of the Papers , Publius claimed to have discharged his burden of proof, i.e., to have shown that adopting the proposed Constitution was in his countrymen’s interest and to have answered all doubts and objections worth considering. Given the dire national emergency growing out of the imbecility of government under the older Articles of Confederation, Publius maintained, (i) that his readers now had an obligation to carefully consider his arguments and (ii) that the Anti-Federalists had obligation to justify the time and risk involved in further consideration by speaking with reason and evidence to the issues as framed by the Federalist (Hamilton et al., 1961, 552-553). The apparent force of the argumentation in the Federalist Papers, as construed by Publius, was to shift the burden of proof to the Anti-Federalists and demand that they justify continued debate over the Constitution by speaking to the issues as he framed them. Were that force acknowledged, his configuration of the issues would become the pivot on which the probative responsibilities of the advocates turned.

It might now be wondered whether Publius’ construction of the issues and attendant probative burdens carried any force beyond the pages of his essays. Are we talking about obligations and duties which authors of the Federalist Papers merely hoped to impose, or are we discussing obligations recognized and honored by other participants in the controversy? The debates over the Constitution at the Virginia Ratification Convention provide an especially interesting and convenient site for investigating this question. Virginia was a key state in the ratification contest. Had she failed to approve the Constitution, the ratification process could have stalled and reform might well have been thrown into a second Constitutional Convention. Moreover, the contest in Virginia was very close; at the outset of the Virginia Ratification Convention, neither Federalists nor Anti-Federalists were confident of victory (Banning, 1989, 262) More importantly, from our point of view, as the debates in Virginia unfolded the probative responsibilities of the advocates came to turn on Publius’ construction of the issues.

As the Virginia delegates gathered early in June of 1788, the positions of the advocates and their respective probative responsibilities paralleled the situation as constructed by Publius in the opening issues of the Federalist Papers. Notice first how burdens of proof were initially distributed. The probative responsibilities recognized by the advocates in Virginia were derived from broader duties and rights recognized at the start of the Convention by the assembly and its leadership. The primary duty of the delegates, the duty to deliberate and decide, was identified by Edmund Pendleton, chair elect, in his opening charge to the delegates.

    We are met together on this Solemn Occasion as Trustees for a Great people, the Citizens of Virginia, to deliberate & decide upon a Plan proposed for the Government of the United States. . . ..

    The Trust is Sacred & important, and requires our most Serious Attention. Let us calmly reason with each other, as Friends, having all the same end in view, the real happiness of our Constituents, avoiding all heats, Intemperance & Personal Altercations, which always impede, but never Assist Fair Investigation. Let us Probe the Plan to the Bottom, but let us do it with Candor, temper & mutual Forebearance; & finally decide as our Judgment shall direct (Kaminski & Saladino, 1988, 911).

In addition to this duty to deliberate and decide, the Assembly also committed itself to the “fullest and freest enquiry into the Constitution, clause by clause, before any general previous question be put.”(914). As a corollary to the duty to deliberate and decide, the Federalists maintained that the Convention was to reach a timely decision prior to commencement of next session of the Virginia Legislature” (915). Both the duty to deliberate and decide and the right to full and free investigation were subject to interpretation regarding the presumptions to which members were entitled and their probative duties. The leading Anti-Federalist voice at the Convention, Patrick Henry, presented himself as “the servant of the people of this Commonwealth, as a centinel over their rights, liberty, and happiness” (929). In this capacity, Henry claimed it was his duty to voice suspicions regarding measures which he conceived to be dangerous to the liberty of his countrymen. Accordingly he admonished his colleagues, “Guard with jealous attention the public liberty. Suspect every one who approaches that jewel” (952). Presuming full and free debate on the Constitution and cloaked in the righteousness of his duty, Henry spoke out of a purported obligation to express his suspicions about the very grave dangers posed by the new Constitution. That posture freed him, and fellow Anti-Federalists, of any substantial burden of proof. The Federalists, on the other hand, did accept an initial burden of proof. Opening the debate for the Federalists, George Mason committed himself to full and free discussion, and on behalf of his party, he shouldered the responsibility of answering doubts and objections regarding the proposed Constitution (918). Paralleling the allocation of probative responsibilities established by Publius in proposing the Constitution for consideration, at the outset of the Virginia Ratification Convention, the Federalists accepted the burden of proof, while the Anti-Federalists abrogated to themselves the right to raise largely unsubstantiated objections.

Likewise, the issues as initially framed by the contending parties at the Virginia convention correspond closely to the disparate positions articulated by each side prior to the publication of the Federalist Papers. At the start and continuing through much of the Convention, the Virginia Anti-Federalists claimed that the powers vested in the national government by the Constitution were so dangerous as to constitute overriding reason for its rejection. The Virginia Federalists initially argued that “though some small defects may appear” in the Constitution, “yet its merits . . . will amply cover those defects” (918). These positions exhibit the incongruity which Publius’ argumentation managed to overcome.

Madison’s participation in the Virginia Convention was delayed by illness, but on June 6 he introduced the demand that that Anti-Federalists accept a burden of proof apportioned along the lines propounded by Publius at the conclusion of the Federalist Papers. As a matter of the delegates’ duty to deliberate and decide, Madison demanded that the Anti-Federalists accept a burden of proof corresponding to the Federalists acknowledged probative responsibilities.

. . . we ought not to address our arguments to the feelings and passions, but to those understandings and judgments which were selected by the people of this country, to decide this great question, by a calm and rational investigation. I hope that Gentlemen, in displaying their abilities, on this occasion, instead of giving opinions and making assertions, will condescend to prove and demonstrate, by a fair and regular discussion (989).

Then turning to Patrick Henry’s complaints, Madison responded as follows.

He told us, that this Constitution ought to be rejected, because it endangered the public liberty, in his opinion, in many instances. Give me leave to make one answer to that observation--Let the dangers which this system is supposed to be replete with, be clearly pointed out. If any dangerous and unnecessary powers be given to the general legislature, let them be plainly demonstrated, and let us not rest satisfied with general assertions of dangers, without examination. If power be necessary, apparent danger is not a sufficient reason against conceding them (989).

Here and in subsequent argumentation Madison relied upon Publius’ principle for framing the key issues in the ratification controversy: ask first whether a power was necessary and, then, whether it was guarded against abuse. And, following Publius’s strategy, Madison coupled this principle with the demand that as Federalist discharged their probative, the Anti-Federalist were to accept the burden of substantively addressing the issues as framed by the Federalists.

A key component in Madison’s strategy was the standard of proof he relied upon to argue that powers proposed for the new government were sufficiently protected against abuse. He did not maintain that those powers were so well restrained as to render abuse impossible. That he regarded as beyond human power. Rather he argued that the powers in question were shown to be sufficiently well guarded when it could be seen that their abuse would be highly improbable. That was all reason and human effort could be expected to do. For example, defending the Constitution’s provision for a national militia, Madison argued, first, that some such power was necessarily given to every government in order to provide for defense against external invasion and internal (1302). He then addressed Henry’s warnings about the dangers of abuse as follows

But it is urged, that abuses may happen.—How is it possible to answer objections against possibility of abuses? It must strike every logical reasoner, that these cannot be entirely provided against (1302).

The Constitution, Madison, maintained provided sufficient checks against the abuses associated with standing armies: “There is a powerful check in that paper. The State Governments are to govern the militia, when not called forth for the general national purposes; and Congress is to govern such part only as may be in the actual service of the Union” (1311). The restrictions on Congressional authority, together with Congress’s responsibility to the electorate, would render abuse improbable. Once that has been shown, Madison maintained that the Federalists had discharged their burden of proof and further consideration, based on mere suspicion would be a waste of valuable time, a violation of the delegates’ duty to reach a timely decision.

Madison’s construction of issues was promptly adopted by his colleagues as the core of the Federalist position at the Virginia Convention.[3] And as the Federalists, responding to Anti-Federalist charges, mounted arguments designed to show that the powers allocated to the national government under the proposed Constitution were both necessary and well guarded, they sought to impose upon their opponents the burden of substantiating objections to the Constitution. On June 14, in a statement representative of the tenor of Federalist argumentation, Henry Lee pointedly criticized the Anti-Federalist reliance on suspicion of the mere possibility of harm and their propensity to speculate about dangers without regard for the consistency of their arguments.

I am anxious to know the truth on this great occasion. I was in hopes of receiving true information, but have been disappointed. I have heard suspicions against possibility, and not against probability. As to the distinction which lies between the gentlemen and for and against the Constitution: In the first place most of the arguments the latter use, pay no regard to the necessity of the Union, which is our object. In the next place they use contradictory arguments. . . . Ought we to adduce arguments like these, which imply a palpable contradiction? We ought to use arguments capable of discussion (1292-93).

As the Anti-Federalists persisted in speculations about the possible dangers posed by the Constitution, the Federalist repeatedly criticized their opponents for failure to shoulder the probative obligations presumably incumbent on them and for wasting time by raising matters not worth considering, and, hence, for violating their duty to deliberate and decide in a timely fashion. Eventually, the Federalist refused further response, claiming that the Anti-Federalist objections had sufficiently answered (1287 & 1293).

The Anti-Federalists did not immediately capitulate to their opponents’ demands. To the bitter end, Patrick Henry stood fast in his role as a “centinel,” insisting that possibilities for abuse warranted the conclusion that the proposed “change is dangerous and ought not be made” (1317). His ally, George Mason, refused to abandon the principle that since “what may be done, will be done,” the mere possibility of abuse suffices as cause for alarm.” (1291). In these and other avowals, the leadership of the Anti-Federalist party clung tenaciously to the position that since the possibility of grave abuse had not been refuted, their continued opposition to the Constitution was warranted.

It is, however, apparent from the record that Henry’s colleagues were moved to address the issues as framed by Madison. On June 10, James Monroe opened his consideration of the powers granted the Federal Government, not by claiming the powers granted under the Constitution were so dangerous as to comprise overriding objection to its adoption, but by asking “What are the powers the Federal Government ought to have?” While Monroe’s answers to this question argued that various powers provided by the new Constitution were unnecessary, it joined the debate within the issue framework laid out by Madison (1109-1110). On June 14, George Mason’s arguments implicitly accepted Madison’s construction of the issues. Admitting “that the nature of the country rendered a full representation impracticable,” he urged that “this impracticality constituted a conclusive reason for granting no powers to the Government, but such as were absolutely indispensable, and these to be most cautiously guarded” (1290). In the sessions which followed, Mason repeatedly argued within Madison’s interpretation of the issues (for examples, see: 1317, 1363). His consideration of the treaty making powers to be vested in the national government clearly reflected Mason’s drift into the structure established by Madison.

I acknowledge such a power must rest somewhere. It is so in all Governments. . . . For my part I have never heard it denied that such power must be vested in the Government.—Our complaint is, that it is not sufficiently guarded, and that it requires more solemnity and caution than is provided in that system (1390).

In the face of Federalist demands that they live up to their probative responsibilities, the Anti-Federalist leadership at the Virginia Convention reluctantly and fitfully came to argue within the framework of issues originally delineated by Publius and introduced into the Convention by Madison.

Eventually the Convention settled down to the clause by clause consideration of the Constitution to which it had initially committed itself, and as the end of that consideration approach, the Anti-Federalists did little to resist the Federalist claim that their responses to objections raised against the Constitution warranted termination of the debate. On June 25 Nicholas called for an end to the deliberations. “I do not mean enter into any further debate. The friends of the Constitution wish to take up no more time, the matter being fully discussed. They are convinced that further time will answer no end but to serve the cause of those who wish to destroy the Constitution. We wish it to be ratified, and such amendments as may be thought necessary to be subsequently considered by a Committee, in order to be recommended to Congress, to be acted upon according to the amendatory mode presented in itself”(1516). The final vote, approving the Constitution by a narrow but significant ten-vote margin, reflected the fact that wavering delegates were in the final analysis not moved by the Anti-Federalist position.

In review, we have analyzed an example of issue management in which stasis was established between initially disparate positions. The strategy which produced this result had two principal components: (a) communicative based allocation of probative obligations and (b) an interpretation of the issues which rendered contending positions commensurable. Both in the text of the Federalist Papers and at the outset of the Virginia Convention, proponents of the Constitution openly accepted the probative duties as a condition of securing consideration for their argumentation, and by discharging those obligations they warranted the demand that other parties accept the burden of substantively address the issues as constructed by the Federalists. In the course of argumentation in the Papers and at the Virginia Convention, the Federalists interpreted their probative responsibilities in terms which collimated Anti-Federalist objections and Federalist argumentation. They were thus able to impose on the Anti-Federalist an obligation to address the issue as interpreted by Publius/Madison, creating a stasis on which the probative burdens of contending parties turned. It should be noted that both components—strategic allocation of probative duties and reinterpretation of the issues—were practically necessary. Federalist argumentation claimed only to show that the powers to be granted the National Government were well enough guarded so as to render serious abuse improbable. By itself this line of argumentation could not have sufficed to answer the Anti-Federalist objection that the dangers in question were so awful that the mere possibility of abuse warranted rejection of the Constitution. To deal with this disparity in probative standards, the Federalists needed a configuration of probative obligations which committed contending parties to substantively address matters which were in the time available worth considering. A normative framework of distributing probative obligations was pragmatically necessary to the Federalist’s strategy for establishing a common set of critical issues in the ratification debates.

5.         Conclusions.

We have found footings for a positive answer to our initial question of whether there are specifically rhetorical norms pertaining to the argumentative adequacy of persuasive discourse? Our approach to this question focused on the discursive phenomena identified by classical rhetoricians as stasis or critical issues upon which persuasive argumentation turns. A review of classical doctrines pointed to some significant theoretical possibilities. But the rhetorical arts of Greek and Roman antiquity offer narrowly pragmatic accounts of stasis, which do not articulate a normative component beyond the injunction that to effectively persuade an arguer needs to address the central issues in dispute. Nor do those predominately judicial conceptions of stasis readily accommodate the complexity of key issues in modern deliberative argument. However, examination of the probative obligations generated in certain illocutionary acts has yielded the rudiments of a normative account of stasis, which seems to make room for both forensic and deliberative argumentation. And examination of an exemplary case of civic argumentation indicates that a configuration of key issues conforming to our account can exercise a regulative influence in highly contested public deliberation. We have, in short, found norms related to the quality of several kinds of persuasive argumentation, which on their face would seem to fall within the traditional scope of rhetorical art.

This finding transforms the question with which our inquiry started into something of a mandate for argumentation scholars working in rhetorical traditions. Where initially we wondered whether rhetorical art can sustain norms intrinsic to the adequacy of persuasive argumentation, it now seems apparent, not only that there are such norms, but also that rhetoricians ought to dedicate clearer, more explicit attention to the normative dimensions of persuasive argumentation than has traditionally typified their studies. To be sure, major theorists in the history of rhetoric aspired to correct defects in political oratory, “recommending methods and principles to improve practice” (Bitzer, 1981, 227). And rhetorical traditions have explicitly upheld standards of rhetorical excellence, appropriateness and prudence (Leff, 2000, 244-245). But it is also the case that in these traditions, persuasive effectiveness has occupied center stage, with normative considerations consigned to the wings or even left backstage. What we have learned about probative obligations and issue management in persuasive argumentation opens a window on a normative domain which rhetoricians neglect at the price of failing to account for matters which are traditionally the prerogative and responsibility of their art.

Rhetorical art has traditionally been concerned with the power of persuasive discourse and the means available for its production. We have seen that the probative obligations incurred in proposing, accusing, and comparable communicative acts contribute significantly to the persuasive power of some kinds of argumentation. By openly undertaking probative burdens in appropriate circumstances, an arguer can induce, or even coerce, addressees to grant a hearing to her arguments. If she is able to conspicuously discharge her probative duties she may be able to impose upon her addressees an obligation to carefully consider her arguments and a larger to duty justify further opposition by accepting a burden of proof. And by discharging her probative obligations, an astute proposer may be able to establish a favorable configuration of key issues as the stasis on which the probative responsibilities of relevant advocates turn. Clearly these discursive resources fall within the purview of rhetorical art.

There is a second respect in which the probative obligations and strategies for issue management discussed above fit the traditional orientation of rhetorical art. Rhetorical theorists have long maintained that controversial questions calling for (public) decision and judgments require argumentation which is responsive to the unique circumstances and materials of particular cases, which varies according to generic differences, and which takes into account the demands of the audiences addressed. As Michael Leff observes, attention to these situational features of argumentation characterizes a rhetorical perspective, as distinct from the traditional focus of dialectic on abstract issues, idealized procedures, and general norms of rationality (Leff, 2000, 243-244). The probative obligations generated by proposers, accusers, etc. and by their argumentation are sensitive to the exigencies of unique situations. They correspond to generic differences in argumentation. And they are incurred with respect to parties engaged in specific interactions. They are, in short, situation-responsive norms of the sort one would expect to find recognized by rhetorical art. The heirs of that tradition have a duty to explicate and analyze these dimensions of the normative structure of argumentation.

It should also be clear that a great deal of scholarly work on these topics remains to be done. This brief essay has offered only a gesture in the direction of a contemporary account of stasis in persuasive argumentation. To develop an adequate account, we need to know more about the range of this discursive phenomena. Can stasis be identified in genres of argumentation other than judicial and deliberative? We need to map the ways in which arguers can strategically manage issues through allocation of probative obligations, and the abuses of those strategies. And we need to investigate the epistemic ramifications of such strategies. These and other questions call out for answers.

Finally, my suggestion that rhetoricians should give more attention to the normative dimensions of persuasive argumentation, especially to situation-specific probative obligations and concomitant strategies for issue management, should not be construed as an attempt to mark off these topics as the exclusive concern of rhetoricians. Today it is not important to preserve the antiquated domains of rhetoric and dialectic as separate fiefdoms; rather, what matters now are the insights into argumentation that scholars in both traditions gain by addressing questions which arise at the interface of these hoary disciplines. The obligations arguers incur and the resources available for discharging them comprise a large area for study shared by scholars working in both traditions. We have seen that in some kinds of persuasive argumentation norms specific to particular discursive interactions can be strategically generated. This possibility speaks to questions and problems of mutual interest to rhetoricians and dialecticians. For example, informal logicians, pragma-dialecticians, and scholars with a rhetorical background share a concern for questions about whether and under what conditions an arguer will have discharged her probative obligations. Pragma-dialecticians answer this question by reference to their idealized model for the conduct of argumentation under conditions of cooperation; their answer is that ideally arguers will have discharged their dialectical responsibilities when their disagreement has been resolved to the satisfaction of all parties. But they also recognize that in real life, argumentation is often conducted under less than ideal circumstances: “. . .practical demands such as the need to come to a decision now or an artificial limitation on the range of standpoints available for consideration will restrict the principle of open exploration of possible standpoints and the grounds for those standpoints” (Eemeren et al., 1993, 33). Informal logicians have puzzled over whether there are rational limits to an arguer obligation to respond to doubts, objections, and counter-arguments. Ralph Johnson has been inclined to the view that an arguer is obliged to provide an exhaustive case, answering all doubts, objections, etc. which could be raised against her position; (Johnson, 1996, 81 & 100-101). Trudy Govier has argued that arguers are only obliged to provide a good case by providing “a cogent main argument for his or her position and that he or she respond to objections and alternative positions with cogent supplementary arguments, but “unlike the Exhaustive Case, the Good Case does not respond to all objections and all alternative positions” (1997). From a rhetorical perspective, it seems apparent that persuasive argumentation about matters of public concern must issue in timely decisions, so arguers addressing matters of practical importance need competent ways to limit their probative responsibilities (Kauffeld, 1998, 440-441; 1999; Leff, 2000, 249-252). Situationally sensitive, strategically engaged probative obligations such as are incurred in acts of proposing and advising cast light on how arguers can reasonably and responsibly restrict their duty to respond to questions and objections in circumstances where limitations are practically necessary. The question of how arguers can limit their probative duties as practically required is an example of larger set of questions which need to be asked by dialecticians and rhetoricians regarding how situation-specific argumentative norms relate to general standards of rationality and epistemic adequacy. There are, I think, enough questions in this domain to support a new century of dialogue between rhetoricians and dialecticians.

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